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ANTITRUST LAW
Michael R. Fontham*
The developments in the field of antitrust involved a number of
areas. In a major interpretation of the Robinson-Patman and Clayton
Acts, the Supreme Court eliminated the automatic damages rule and
held that a plaintiff must prove actual injury to be successful.' The
Court also resolved a split among the circuits on the issue of con-
tribution in antitrust cases, endorsing the majority rule that refused
to recognize a right of contribution In addition, several decisions
were rendered by the courts of appeals that limited the scope of the
antitrust laws on various grounds. Moreover, two rulings of courts
of appeals gave further definition to the applicable evidentiary stan-
dard in predatory pricing cases. In other developments, important
decisions were rendered in cases involving the issues of monopoliza-
tion, standing, distributor terminations, the right of jury trial, real
estate multiple listing services, conspiracy, and franchise tying ar-
rangements.
THE REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL INJURY TO SUPPORT A
ROBINSON-PATMAN CIVIL DAMAGES CLAIM
The treble damages provision of the Clayton Act provides a
right of action to "[any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... I
In cases brought pursuant to the Robinson-Patman Act, the question
of whether the requisite injury may be inferred from proof of sub-
stantial price discrimination had split the circuit courts.4 In a case
involving a claim of price discrimination alleged, to result from a
discriminatory bonus incentive program in the marketing of automo-
biles, the Fifth Circuit held that the failure of the plaintiff to offer
any substantial evidence of injury attributable to the incentive pro-
gram was fatal to the action.' The Supreme Court upheld this sub-
stantive ruling, but vacated and remanded the decision of the court
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1923 (1981).
2. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
4. Compare Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970) with Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
5. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc. 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).
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of appeals for a further analysis of the evidence on the issue of
damages in J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.'
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act' makes it unlawful to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition. To prove
a violation of this provision, a plaintiff need not show that actual in-
jury to competition resulted from the price discrimination.8 For a
private plaintiff to recover treble damages pursuant to this provi-
sion, however, he must proceed under section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which embodies the requirement of injury to the plaintiff's business
or property Interpreting this provision as "remedial"'" in nature, as
compared to the "prophylactic"" provision of the Robinson-Patman
Act allowing proof that competition "may" have been injured, the
Court ruled that a treble damage plaintiff "must make some show-
ing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent."'" It rejected the argument that injury
could be inferred from the proof of price discrimination alone or
from proof that injury to competition might result from the discrimi-
nation. 3
The Court indicated that any plaintiff proceeding under section
4 of the Clayton Act would have to prove actual injury to his busi-
ness or property. It relied on a merger decision arising under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc.,' which held that the injury requirement of section 4 is not
satisfied by a showing under section 7 that a merger may lessen
competition. "Likewise in this case," said the Court, "proof of a vio-
lation does not mean that a disfavored purchaser has been actually
'injured' within the meaning of § 4.'1 In addition, the Court inter-
preted the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act as in-
dicating a Congressional rejection of proposals for an automatic
damage rule."
6. .101 S. Ct. 1923 (1981).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
8. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U.S. 726.
742 (1945).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
10. 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 1927.
16. Id. at 1927-28. The Court determined that the original Patman bill, H.R. 8442,
§ 2(d), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) and the Robinson bill, S. 3154, § 2(d), 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935), provided for a presumption that any plaintiff would be damaged in the
1,982]
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Although the claim that price discrimination, by itself, would
make out a cause of action and entitle the plaintiff to damages was
rejected by the Court, it did not direct the outright dismissal of the
claim. Instead, the Court indicated that once the plaintiff proves a
violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, a lenient stan-
dard will be applied to determine whether damages can be proven."
The Fifth Circuit had bypassed the issue whether a section 2(a)
violation occurred, grounding its decision on the plaintiff's failure to
"introduce substantial evidence of injury attributable to the pro-
grams .... "' Thus, the Court vacated and remanded the case for a
consideration of whether a section 2(a) violation had been proven. It
directed the court of appeals, if it determined that a violation had
occurred, to review the evidence of injury in light of the lenient
damages standard mandated by previous cases."
The doubts of the Court as to the adequacy of proof of injury
arose primarily because of the plaintiff's failure to show any effect
of the alleged price discrimination on retail prices. 0 The claim of
lost sales resulting from the alleged discrimination was weak
because of the absence of any proof that the alleged violation allowed
the plaintiff's competitors to undersell it.' The plaintiff argued,
however, that its lost profits made it less able to compete effectively
because it had fewer funds with which to advertise and make capital
expenditures.' The plaintiff suffered a four percent drop in its
market share in one of the years of the damage period and inferred
that this loss was attributable to the alleged discrimination." The
Court found that, "[e]ven construed most favorably to petitioner, the
amount of the price discrimination, but these provisions were removed from the
legislation.
17. This determination flowed from the Court's "traditional rule excusing anti-
trust plaintiffs from an unduly rigorous standard of proving antitrust injury." 101 S.
Ct. at 1929. The rule rests on two theories noted by the Court in Truett Payne. First,
the "vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff's
situtation would have been in the absence of the defendant's antitrust violation." Id
Second, "it does not 'come with very good grace' for the wrongdoer to insist upon
specific and certain proof of the injury which it has itself inflicted." Id.
18. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th Cir.
1979).
19. 101 S. Ct. at 1930.
20. Id. at 1928.
21. Id. n.4. See also, the statement of Mr. Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion,
which was joined by three other members of the Court: "A plaintiff must show, to
recover damages for a violation of § 2(a), that unlawful discrimination in price allowed a
favored competitor to draw sales or profits from him, the unfavored competitor." Id. at
1931 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22. Ld. at 1928 n.4.
23. Id. at 1938.
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evidence of injury is weak."2 However, it refused to hold that this
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.2
The primary problem with the decision in Truett Payne is the
failure adequately to distinguish injury as prerequisite to the
establishment of a claim under section 4 of the Clayton Act from the
damages flowing from an antitrust violation. It is one thing to apply
a lenient evidentiary standard in assessing the proof of the amount
of a plaintiff's damage, and another to apply this standard in deter-
mining whether one of the elements of the violation has been prov-
en." By engrafting the lenient damage rule onto the evaluation of
whether "injury" has been proven as an element of the offense, the
Court in effect compromised between the approach that presumes
injury from price discrimination alone and the standard that would
require the plaintiff to fully prove the injury. Under the Court's
decision, a plaintiff in a section 2(a) Robinson-Patman action ap-
parently will be required to prove: (1) a price discrimination that
violates section 2(a), by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) that the
price discrimination injured the plaintiff in his business or property,
under a more lenient standard than previously was applied to the
assessment of damages; and (3) the amount of damages, which would
also be determined under the lenient standard.
The rejection of the automatic damages rule by the Supreme
Court resulted in similar rulings by two courts of appeals. In Allen
Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co.,"7 the First Circuit followed
Truett Payne and affirmed the dismissal of a price discrimination
suit on the ground that the evidence could not support a finding of
injury to the plaintiff resulting from the alleged violation." The pur-
ported price discrimination in the marketing of stationary and
school supplies affected less than two percent of the plaintiffs
business." The only evidence of damage to the plaintiff was an
estimate by its president of a decrease in the rate of growth of total
sales allegedly attributable to the discrimination."°The court deter-
mined that even under a lenient damages rule, the "showing here is
clearly inadequate."'"
24. Id. at 1929.
25. Id. at 1928, 1929 & n.4.
26. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Powell, 101 S. Ct. at 1931.
27. 653 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 23. The court added:
Unlike Truett Payne, appellant here produced no economic expert; it did not go
out of business; it showed no absolute drop in sales; and the affected sales were
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit followed Truett Payne in overrul-
ing an automatic damage award that had been granted under the
prevailing rule in that circuit in Vanco Beverages, Inc. v. Falls City
Industries, Inc. " The district court was directed to "assess plaintiff's
damages by virtue of lost sales and profits."33
RESOLUTION OF THE CONTRIBUTION ISSUE
Resolving another split that had developed among the circuit
courts, the Supreme Court in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc.' ruled that a defendant in an antitrust action has no
right to seek contribution from joint tort-feasors. The Eighth Circuit
had previously ruled that contribution may be enforced in an anti-
trust action, 5 while the Fifth and Tenth Circuits applied the tradi-
tional rule under federal common law that precluded a defendant
from seeking contribution in tort cases." The Supreme Court affirmed
a ruling of the Fifth Circuit that denied a claim of contribution. 7
The opinion in Texas Industries identified conflicting policy in-
terests for and against a rule that would allow contribution. 8
However, these interests were deemed less important than a "very
but a tipy fraction of its total business. While these are not indispensable prereq-
uisites, their absence is fatal when a Robinson-Patman Act plaintiff fails, as here,
to provide any coherent theory making plausible a causal connection between any
violation that it was likely to show and any significant actual injury.
Id. The court also found that the -requisite injury was not established for claims of
violation of sections 2(e) and 2(c). Id at 24-25.
32. 654 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1981). This case overruled the standard set forth in
Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1976). The Vanco decision is also
notable for its holding that the "meeting competition" defense of section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976), is not established by a showing that the
defendant held prices stable in one geographic area while raising prices in response to
a competitor's price changes in another area. 654 F.2d at 1230.
33. 654 F.2d at 1231.
34. 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981).
35. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
36. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 939 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) E-1 (10th Cir. 1979).
37. The Wilson P. Abraham decision, 604 F.2d 897, was the case reviewed by the
Court.
38. These arguments include the contentions in favor of a rule of contribution that
"fairness and equity [require that the] often massive judgments in antitrust actions be
shared by all the wrongdoers" and that, if the contribution rule were adopted, a
"greater likelihood" would exist that "all wrongdoers will be held liable and thus share
the consequences of the wrongdoing." 101 S. Ct. at 2064. Opponents of the proposed
rule arged that the deterrent force of the antitrust laws is enhanced by the possibility
"that a single participant could be held fully liable for the total amount of the judg-
ment." d at 2065.
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significant and perhaps dispositive threshold question: whether
courts have the power to create such a cause of action absent leg-
islation and, if so, whether that authority should be exercised in this
context." 9 The Court held that the power to create an additional an-
titrust remedy is not vested in the courts." As the antitrust laws do
not explicitly or implicitly create this right of action,"' this deter-
mination precluded the. recognition of the alleged claim.
The inquiry as to whether the federal courts possess the power
to fashion a right of contribution involved analysis of two areas.
First, the Court inquired as to whether "a federal rule of decision is
'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.'"42 Although the
antitrust area involves a strong federal interest, the requisite excep-
tional interest was not present because the contribution issue does
not involve "the duties of the Federal Government, the distribution
of powers in our federal system, or matters necessarily subject to
federal control even in the absence of statutory authority."43
Second, the Court reviewed the antitrust laws and determined
that Congress has not "vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and
empowered them"" to create new antitrust remedies. While the
Court held that the judiciary possesses the right to develop a common
law of antitrust under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 5 it
found that this power does not extend to the formulation of reme-
dies. The Court distinguished the "sweeping language"'" of the first
two sections of the Sherman Act, which assertedly contemplate
judicial interpretation, from the "detailed and specific"'7 remedial
provisions passed by Congress. According to the Court, this detail
indicates that Congress did not contemplate judicial action to create
new antitrust remedies. Thus, it determined that the issue should be
left for Congrr.ss to resolve. 8
RESTRICTIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A number of cases were decided that tend to restrict the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws. They include a case holding that
39. Id at 2065-66.
40. Id at 2070.
41. Id at 2066-67.
42. Id at 2067.
43. Id. at 2068.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2069.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2070. For a more detailed discussion of the courts of appeals decisions
on the contribution question, see Fontham, Developments in the Law
19791980-Antitrust Law, 41 LA. L. REV. 314, 428-32 (1981).
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federal instrumentalities are not subject to the Sherman Act, two
rulings applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to preclude liability
for alleged anticompetitive conduct, a holding that the Capper-
Volstead Act permits price-fixing by associations of dairy cooper-
atives and a holding that the scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction
under the "effect on commerce" test should be construed narrowly.
On the other hand, two cases rejected claims of antitrust immunity
arising under laws regulating the insurance industry.
Immunity of Federal Instrumentalities
The trend of decisions in recent years had tended to limit the
scope of governmental immunity from antitrust liability. These
cases have increasingly reduced the reach of the "state action" doc-
trine announced in Parker v. Brown,49 in which actions of the state
were held to be outside the scope of the antitrust laws." In addition,
in at least one case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, an instrumentality of the
District of Columbia was held to be subject to antitrust liability in
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.5" Despite the trend of decisions, and its
own prior ruling in Hecht, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Alaska Railroad2 that a federal in-
strumentality is not subject to the antitrust laws.
The Alaska Railroad is an entity wholly owned and operated by
the United States." It was alleged to have conspired with a private
corporation to eliminate competition and monopolize business in
Alaska. The district court dismissed the action on the ground of
sovereign immunity." This rationale was overruled by the appellate
court, but the ruling was nevertheless affirmed on the ground that
"Congress did not place the United States or its instrumentalities
under the governance of the Sherman Act.""0
The decision in the Alaska Railroad case rests primarily on an
interpretation of the ruling of the Supreme Court in United States
v. Cooper Corp.5" and the. legislative history of the Clayton Act. The
court noted that the antitrust laws grant a right of action to "per-
49. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
50. Decisions limiting the scope of Parker v. Brown include: California Retail Liq-
uor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
51. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 244.
54. 1d.
55. Id.
56. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
1490 [Vol. 42
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sons" injured by antitrust violations as well as making "persons"
subject to liability for violations." It reviewed the holding in Cooper
that the United States is not a "person" authorized to maintain a
suit for treble damages under the antitrust laws. In addition, it
relied on the Court's statement "that if the United States qualified
as a 'person' entitled to maintain a treble damage action, it would
also qualify as a 'person' subject to Sherman Act liability."" The
court of appeals inferred that Cooper determined the United States
qualified as neither type of "person." After the decision in Cooper,
Congress amended the Clayton Act to permit the United States to
sue for actual, though not treble, damages for antitrust violations."
It did not amend the Sherman Act to permit the United States to be
held liable. As "Congress had a clear occasion to address the issue in
1955 but failed to do so,"" the court was unwilling " 'to engraft on
[the] statute additions . . . the legislature might or should have
made.' "61
The greatest impediment to the decision of the court of appeals
was its own prior ruling in Hecht. In that case an instrumentality of
the federal government, the District of Columbia Armory Board,
was held to be subject to the antitrust laws." The appellants in
Alaska Railroad relied heavily on Hecht, but the court distinguished
the case on the ground that the Armory Board "more closely
resembl[ed] a municipal agency than a United States instrumentali-
ty."" It distinguished federal from state or municipal agencies on
the basis of a ruling of the Supreme Court, Georgia v. Evans, 4
rendered the year after Cooper, that the states could sue for treble
damages under the antitrust laws. It concluded: "While Hecht
stands as this court's precedent regarding District of Columbia
agencies such as the Armory Board, we hold that Hecht does not
supply analysis appropriate in a case in which the activities of a
United States instrumentality are at issue.""
While the Alaska Railroad case presents a straight-forward anal-
ysis of the Cooper holding and legislative actions occurring in 1955,
its attempt to avoid the precedential impact of Hecht and the deci-
sions involving state agencies is strained. The court failed to
57. 659 F.2d at 245. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15 (1976).
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976).
60. 659 F.2d at 246.
61. Id (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. at 605).
62. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 936-42 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. 659 F.2d at 246.
64. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
65. 659 F.2d at 246-47.
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elaborate on any differences, important to the enforcement of anti-
trust policies, between the Alaska Railroad and the District of Col-
umbia Armory Board. Indeed, both of these instrumentalities were
alleged to have engaged in concerted activity with a private party
to eliminate competition. Moreover, the holding of the Supreme
Court in Cooper, a decision rendered in 1941, is not a good indication
of the Court's current attitude toward the antitrust liability of
governmental agencies. Shortly after the Cooper decision, state action
Was held to be outside the scope of the antitrust laws," yet the
scope of this ruling has been limited significantly by subsequent
cases. If the conclusions as to the states set forth in Parker are no
longer completely valid, the dicta contained in Cooper may also be
suspect. The court of appeals failed to deal adequately with the
trend of decisions limiting the scope of governmental immunity.
Immunity Under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Under the decisions of the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,68 and United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington," private parties may not
be subjected to antitrust liability for concerted attempts to in-
fluence the passage of legislation or for their use of the administra-
tive and judicial processes, even if these activities have an anticom-
petitive purpose. These decisions are grounded in the concept that
parties have the constitutional right to petition the government and
use the governmental processes, even if the purpose of this action
runs counter to the policies embodied in the antitrust laws. The
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is subject to a "sham" exception,
however, in cases where baseless, repetitive claims are brought in a
pattern that abuses the administrative or judicial process, which ex-
ception is discussed in California Motor Transport v. Trucking
Unlimited." In two cases rendered by the courts of appeals, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine was applied to protect parties that
allegedly used judicial and administrative processes to achieve an-
ticompetitive goals.
In Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.," the
Ninth Circuit reviewed a holding that 63 state court collection suits
66. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
67. See note 50, supra.
68. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
69. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
70. See, e.g;, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127. 138 (1961).
71. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
72. 640 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981).
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brought against a party came within the "sham" exception. The
district court had characterized the suits as brought "in furtherance
of an anticompetitive scheme, and used as a bludgeon to retain a
monopoly and to interfere with the business relationships of a com-
petitor."'73 The court of appeals, however, held that the lawsuits
were protected under Noerr-Pennington. It found that the collection
suits were not baseless" and held that "multiplicity, by itself, does
not vitiate the Noerr-Pennington protections," 5 even if brought with
the purpose of interfering with others' business relationships. 6 It
concluded that the collection suits were protected by the first
amendment right to petition the government for the redress of
grievances."
In Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Phar-
maceutical Association," the District of Columbia Circuit held that
certain litigation activities, as well as lobbying efforts with state
pharmaceutical boards, conducted by a pharmaceutical association to
inhibit the sales of a mail order pharmacy were protected under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The court was unimpressed by the argu-
ment that the pharmacy boards were made up of pharmacists who
competed with the plaintiff and therefore catered to the interests of
the pharmaceutical association." "However desirable might be the
goal of ridding government of the appearance of catering to special
interests," it said, "the Sherman Act was not designed to achieve
it. 8 The court also refused to reduce the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington immunity whenr the activities of a pharmaceutical board
shifted from matters of policy to discretionary judgments responsive
to commercial considerations. It held that the proper focus in apply-
ing the doctrine is on the activities of the lobbyists, not on those of
the governmental agency."
Nor would the court accept the contention that the governmental
agencies conspired with the association. Although this conduct, if
proven, would not be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
the court found the evidence insufficient to prove a conspiracy.
Even though the action of board members may have been designed
to further the economic good of the association rather than the
73. Id. at 1109.
74. Id. at 1110.
75. Id. at 1109.
76. Id
77. Id. at 1110.
78. No. 1028 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-24 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at A-25.
80. Id.
81. 1d at A-26.
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public good, the court found that this approach could be explained
without any necessary inference of a conspiracy.2 It held that an in-
ference of conspiracy should be made only when alleged conspirators
take parallel action that is contrary to their own self interests.8 The
court also found that the plaintiff had failed to prove any injury
resulting from these and other alleged violations."
Capper-Volstead Act
The Capper-Volstead Act provides that persons engaged in the
marketing of agricultural products may form associations to market
these products and make "the necessary contracts and agreements
to effect such purposes.""5 This statute has the effect of exempting
farmers who comprise an association from liability for agreements
that otherwise would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, including
price-fixing agreements enacted by the association." However, the
Act does not wholly immunize agricultural associations from conduct
violative of the antitrust laws, including conduct that would violate
the monopolization provision of section 2."
In Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc.,8 two claims were
raised that the conduct of certain dairy cooperatives violated the
antitrust laws. First, because seven cooperatives had formed an
association for the purpose of setting prices, it was claimed that a
section 1 price-fixing violation occurred. The plaintiff, a producer
and dealer-processor in milk, conceded that a cooperative could fix
the prices charged by its members, but contended that cooperatives
could not further agree to form an association for the sole purpose
of fixing prices."' Second, it contended that farm cooperatives may
be held liable for illegally monopolizing a market under the same
standards that would apply to a corporation.
The Second Circuit rejected both these claims. It indicated that
a "de minimus organizational distinction,""g coupled with a "hyper-
technical reading of the statute"' should not permit the plaintiff to
82. Id. at A-27.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
86. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 466
(1960).
87. Id. at 467, 468.
88. 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. IL at 1039.
90. Id. at 1040.
91. Id. at 1039.
92. Id. at 1040.
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avoid the intended effect of the Capper-Volstead Act. Thus, although
the statute specifically permits only the formation of associations of
farmers to market farm products, the court determined that these
associations could further associate to accomplish this purpose. This
conclusion was not affected by the contention that the sole purpose
of the association of cooperatives was to fix prices. The court said
that this action "is an integral part of marketing."" It added: "It
would be strange indeed if participation in this portion of the
marketing process, standing alone, would subject a cooperative to
antitrust liability, when the exercise of the full range of activities
covered by Capper-Volstead would not."9'
A tougher issue was presented by the monopolization claim, on
which the district court had ruled that the plaintiff had "no greater
burden than if he sued a corporation."" The Supreme Court
previously had held that, despite the Capper-Volstead Act, cooper-
atives are not "free to engage in practices against other persons in
order to monopolize trade, or restrain and suppress competition
with the cooperative."" However, the Court had not decided
whether the ordinary standard in monopolization cases would apply
to agricultural cooperatives. If applicable, this standard would make
a cooperative liable if it possessed monopoly power in a market and
willfully acquired or maintained that power."
In Fairdale, the Second Circuit reviewed the legislative history
of the statute and concluded that cooperatives may acquire monopoly
power in a manner that would violate the "willful acquisition" test.
It said:
[Wihile the formation, growth and operation of a powerful
cooperative is obviously a "willful acquisition or maintenance of
such power," and will rarely result from "a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident," . . . it is exactly what
Capper-Volstead permits.9
The court held, however, that a cooperative would violate the Sher-
man Act if it acquired monopoly power- by "other, predatory
means."
99
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 469.
97. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966):
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
98. 635 F.2d at 1045.
99. Id.
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Scope of Interstate Commerce Jurisdiction
in Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,"'° an en banc deci-
sion of the Tenth Circuit, the court refused to expansively interpret
certain lanaguage employed by the Supreme Court last term in
defining the scope of jurisdiction under the commerce clause of the
Sherman Act. In McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,
Inc., ° the Supreme Court ruled that activity challenged as a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act does not have to be an integral part of an
interstate transaction in order for the jurisdictional requirements to
be met.' If jurisdiction is assertedly established under the "effect
on commerce" test, it is only required that the "activities which
allegedly have been infected by a price-fixing conspiracy be shown
'as a matter of practical economics' to have a not insubstantial effect
* on the interstate commerce involved."'0 3 In the course of reaching
this decision, the Court indicated that the full scope of the business
engaged in by the alleged tortfeasors, rather than only their anti-
competitive conduct, could be considered in applying the effect on
commerce test. It said:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act viola-
tion it would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a
substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by
respondents' brokerage activity. Petitioners need not make the
more particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce
caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by
those other aspects of respondents' activity that are alleged to
be unlawful.' 4
The plaintiff in Crane was a doctor who claimed to be the victim
of a conspiracy to restrain his practice and boycott his services. He
sued a corporation that owned seventeen hospitals and the admin-
istrator of one of the hospitals. The plaintiff claimed that in
considering the jurisdictional issue under the McClain ruling, it was
appropriate to consider whether interstate commerce was affected
by the general business .activities of the defendants rather than only
their allegedly illegal activities. The Tenth Circuit, however, declined
to accept this argument. Conceding that "the cited language argu-
ably supports [the plaintiff's] position,'"0 5 it adopted a different con-
struction that assertedly honored prior decisions requiring a nexus
between interstate commerce and the unlawful conduct.'
100. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981).
101. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
102. Id at 244.
103. Id at 246 (citations omitted).
104. Id at 242-43.
105. 637 F.2d at 722.
106. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit's construction of the language cited from Mc-
Clain is strained. The court argued that the Supreme Court meant
only that a general rather than a particularized showing of a logical
connection between the challenged activity and interstate commerce
is sufficient to satisfy an initial jurisdictional inquiry. 7 It said:
In context, then, the Court was referring to the challenged activ-
ities, not the brokers' overall business, by its reference to
"respondents' brokerage activities" in the passage Dr. Crane
relies upon. By stating that plaintiff "need not make the more
particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused
by the conspiracy . . . or other aspects of respondents' activity
that are alleged to be unlawful," the Court was only confirming
the principle set forth in Hospital Building, Burke and Goldfarb
that for jurisdictional purposes a plaintiff need not "make the...
particularized showing." 444 U.S. at 242, 100 S. Ct. at 509. In
other words, an elaborate analysis of interstate impact is not
necessary at the jurisdictional stage, only an allegation showing
a logical connection as a matter of practical economics between
the unlawful conduct and interstate commerce. The emphasis
was intended to be that a "particularized" showing is not
necessary, not that a showing of a nexus between unlawful con-
duct and effect is unnecessary.'
This holding may harmonize McClain with the Tenth Circuit's view
of other cases, but it does not adequately explain away the plain
meaning of the language employed by the Supreme Court."9 The
refusal of the Tenth Circuit to shift the "analytical focus away from
the challenged activity and towards the defendant's general or
overall business" has the effect of placing a jurisdictional burden on
Tenth Circuit plaintiffs that was apparently removed in McClain."'
Insurance Cases
In contrast to the decisions tending to limit the application of
the antitrust laws, two rulings in the insurance field refused to
recognize claims of immunity from antitrust prosecution. In a case
decided by the Supreme Court, a claim that the National Health
107. Id. at 723.
108. Id. (emphasis by the court).
109. A contrary interpretation of McClain was rendered in Western Waste Service
v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
110. Although it refused to adopt the plaintiff's interpretation of McClain, the
court liberally interpreted the allegations of the complaint and determined that the
decision of the district court to dismiss it on jurisdictional grounds was "premature."
637 F.2d at 724.
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Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 ("NHPRDA")
creates an antitrust immunity was rejected in National Gerimedical
Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City."' In
a decision of the Second Circuit, the antitrust exemption contained
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act was strictly construed in Pireno v.
New York State Chiropractic Association."2
The National Gerimedical Hospital case involved the claim that
Blue Cross wrongfully refused to deal with the plaintiff by refusing
to enter into an agreement making it a "participating hospital,"
which would have qualified the plaintiff for the direct reimburse-
ment of the full cost of treatment of individual Blue Cross sub-
scribers. The refusal of Blue Cross to enter the agreement was based
on its policy barring the execution of participation agreements with
new hospitals that did not meet a clearly evident need for health
services in the applicable service area.' In determining that the
plaintiff failed to satisfy this requirement, Blue Cross relied on the
failure of the plaintiff to obtain approval for construction from an
agency funded under the NHPRDA to plan the development of
health services in the local area. The complaint also alleged a con-
spiracy between Blue Cross and the planning agency.1 '
The analysis of the immunity question involved a consideration
of familiar principles. As prior decisions indicate, the claim of an im-
plied antitrust immunity "'is not favored, and can be justified only
by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust
laws and the regulatory system.' """ The regulation of an industry is
not necessarily evidence of an intent to immunize the industry from
antitrust enforcement, though the intent to create an antitrust ex-
ception might be inferred when "a regulatory agency has been em-
powered to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust
challenge.""'
Applied to the case, these principles indicated that an antitrust
exception should not be recognized. First, the challenged "refusal to
deal" was not mandated by any regulatory body and indeed the
regulatory scheme envisioned under the NHPRDA had not been
implemented by the State of Missouri when the challenged activity
occurred. Thus, the conduct of Blue Cross did not deserve
111. 101 S. Ct. 2415 (1981).
112. 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981).
113. 101 S. Ct. at 2417.
114. Id. at 2418.
115. Id. at 2421 (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S.
694. 719-20 (1975)).
116. Id. at 2421-22.
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immunity." ' Second, the Court was unpersuaded that the NHPRDA
was intended to exempt all private conduct undertaken in the health
planning process from the applicability of the antitrust laws.
Although the court recognized that Congress, in passing the
NHPRDA, indicated a belief that the health care industry does not
respond to classic marketplace forces,"8 it nevertheless found the
health planning statute and the antitrust laws reconcilable. Thus,
there was no implied repeal of the antitrust laws in the NHPRDA."9
In Pireno,20 a chiropractor complained that a procedure
employed by an insurance company and a chiropractic association,
which permitted the examination of a chiropractor's fee statements
by a "peer review committee," was a means of fixing prices for
chiropractic services. The district court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the peer review procedure was part of the "bus-
iness of insurance" immunized from the application of the antitrust
laws by section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2' The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the " 'business of insurance' is to be
strictly limited to only the quintessential insurance functions."'22 It
determined that any activity qualifying as the business of insurance
would have to involve the "transfer [of] risk from insured to insurer
or spread of risk among insureds . ".'. ."12 It found "neither risk
transference nor risk spreading in the peer review process,"",
holding instead that the procedure was merely a cost-cutting
device."'
PREDATORY PRICING
The courts of appeals decisions gave definition to the appropri-
ate analysis that should be applied in cases where predatory pricing
is alleged to have been used to gain monopoly power. Both decisions
were grounded in part on the published views of Professors Areeda
and Turner,' which suggest that predation could be proven by
evidence that prices were set below marginal costs. Because avail-
117. Id. at 2422-23.
118. Id. at 2423.
119. Id. at 2423, 2424.
120. 650 F.2d 387.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
122. 650 F.2d at 392. This holding was based on the court's reading of Group Life
& Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
123. 650 F.2d at 393.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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able accounting data usually does not permit a quantification of
marginal cost, these commentators suggest the use of average
variable cost, as a surrogate for marginal cost, to set the dividing
line between predatory and non-predatory pricing."'
In Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,'28 a case involving charges that a regulated monopoly
engaged in predatory activities in the terminal telephone equipment
market, the Second Circuit accepted the view of Areeda and Turner
that "the relationship between a firm's prices and its marginal costs
provides the best single determinant of predatory pricing."" It held
that "prices below reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be
presumed predatory, while prices above reasonably anticipated mar-
ginal cost will be presumed non-predatory.""' The court also ruled
that average variable cost should be used as a surrogate for
marginal cost.
The court rejected arguments that it should adopt an average or
fully distributed cost test, even though the defendant was a multi-
product firm that was regulated by a state agency. Although a
multi-product firm can subsidize losses incurred in the marketing of
one product with profits earned in the sales of another, this factor
did not persuade the court to deviate from the average variable cost
dividing line. It found that a diversified firm suffers the same losses
from predatory pricing as does any other firm.' In addition, as bar-
riers to entry into the product market were low, the court found
that a policy of unremunerative pricing would not be likely to profit
the alleged wrongdoer in the long run. Thus, the court declined to
adopt "a more stringent test of predation merely because SNET is a
diversified firm.' 3 2
Nor was the court persuaded by the contention that "fully
distributed costs" should be used as the predation standard where a
regulated industry is involved. The plaintiff argued that a regulated
entity "can allocate all of its joint costs to the monopoly aspects of
is business, thereby giving it a permanent advantage over its
unregulated competitors."'33 However, the court termed this argu-
ment "seriously flawed."' 3 ' It indicated that any diversified firm, not
127. Id. at 716-18.
128. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 88.
130. Id. (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 89.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 90.
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just a regulated entity, could employ this type of subsidization.
Moreover, the court found that the adoption of the fully distributed
cost standard would injure consumers by requiring the dominant
firm to set prices at a level higher than that which would maximize
consumer welfare.' 0 Furthermore, the court contended that sub-
sidization does not occur so long as price exceeds marginal cost,
regardless of whether it exceeds fully distributed costs.' 6 Finally,
the court was unwilling to accept the premise that the state regu-
latory agency would permit the allocation of costs incurred in the
unregulated sector to the regulated activities of the company.3
As no proof was presented that the defendant's prices were less
than its marginal or average variable costs, the jury verdict based
on predatory pricing was reversed.' 8 The court also overruled the
verdict in a number of other areas.' 9 On one issue, involving the
claim that the defendant designed certain equipment to impede com-
petition in the terminal equipment market by restricting access of
competing equipment to the telephone network, the court deemed
the evidence substantial enough to support a jury verdict.' 0
However, it set aside the verdict and remanded the case for a new
trial on the ground that the jury interrogatories did not make it
clear that the decision on this issue was based solely on the
evidence relating to the issue, as opposed to a "spill-over from the
practices found not . . . anticompetitive."'
On the equipment design issue, the court also was confronted
with the claim that the defendant's actions were immunized from an-
titrust liability because the telephone company's requirement of a
"protective coupler" for use with competing terminal equipment was
subject to the review of the Federal Communications Commission."2
It rejected this contention. First, the court held that the Com-
munications Act does not "expressly authorize the FCC to approve
protective coupler designs that unreasonably restrict competition."'43
Second, it found that the application of the antitrust laws would not
so disrupt the regulatory scheme as to make it unworkable. Indeed,
the FCC never approved the protective coupler tariff that was filed
by the Bell System."' Thus, the court determined that the applica-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 91.
139. Id at 91-94.
140. Id. at 94.
141. Id at 94-95.
142. Id. at 82.
143. Id. at 83.
144. Id. at 83-84.
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tion of the Sherman Act to the equipment design issue would not
create a conflict with the regulatory scheme." 5
In another predatory pricing case, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
variation of the Areeda-Turner analysis in William Ingles & Sons Bak-
ing Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co."' In Ingles, the plaintiff
charged that Continental sought to eliminate competition in the
wholesale bread market in California by charging predatory and
discriminatory prices for its private label bread. It claimed that this
conduct violated the "attempt to monopolize" prohibition of section
2 of the Sherman Act and also violated the Robinson-Patman Act.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the district court
granted motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alter-
natively, a new trial. The court of appeals overturned the judgment,
but held that the decision to grant a new trial was not an abuse of
discretion." 7
On the issue of predatory pricing, the court indicated that the
Areeda-Turner line of average variable cost is a useful, but not ex-
clusive, evidentiary standard."' It said that an "ultimate standard"
for a determination of predation should not employ strict adherence
to a particular cost based rule, but should focus on the tendency of a
firm's pricing practices "to eliminate rivals and create a market
structure enabling the seller to recoup his losses.""' It erected a
standard that would shift the overall burden of proof to the defen-
dant if its prices are shown to have been less than average variable
costs. The court stated:
Guided by these principles, we hold that to establish predatory
pricing a plaintiff must prove that the anticipated benefits of
defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or elim-
inate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability
to reap the benefits of monopoly power. If the defendant's prices
were below average total cost but above average variable cost,
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing defendant's pricing
was predatory. If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defen-
dant's prices were below average variable cost, the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of predatory pricing and the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were
justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect
they might have on competitors. 5 '
145. Id. at 84.
146. 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 943, 952, 962.
148. Id. at 936-37.
149. Id. at 939.
150. Id. at 940.
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The court also commented on the appropriate method for the
determination of variable costs. After a review of various considera-
tions, it found that the determination of which costs are variable
will vary from case to case. 5' However, the "first step" in the
analysis generally should be to "compare the costs of production
before and after the price reduction" ' 2 alleged to be predatory.
According to the court, "It]he variable costs would then be those ex-
penses that increased as a result of the output expansion at-
tributable to the price reduction."''
With respect to the Robinson-Patman Act claim of primary line
injury resulting from predatory price discrimination, the court held
that the same burden of proof standard should apply. 5' It recognized
some differences exist in the elements of a Sherman Act predation
claim and a Robinson-Patman action, including the fact that a
Robinson-Patman violation may be established without proof of
predatory intent. Thus, the court did not hold that the statutes are
fully synchronized. 5 However, when the proof of predatory pricing
is the basis for claiming the requisite competitive injury under the
Robinson-Patman Act, the court held that no reason exists to apply
a different analysis to the predation claim."
Two other important antitrust issues were resolved in Ingles.
First, the court held that a "meeting competition" defense under
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act will apply to market-wide
price reductions if the defendant has a reasonable basis for believing
that competitors are offering the lower price throughout the
market.' Second, in reversing a summary judgment dismissing a
claim of an intra-enterprise conspiracy, the court held that "two
corporations, although part of the same corporate 'family,' are in-
capable of conspiring unless they function as a single economic
unit."'"
MONOPOLIZATION
In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,""5 SCM claimed that the acquisi-
tion by Xerox of certain patents and its refusal td' license the
patents prevented SCM from competing effectively in the "conve-
151. Id. at 942.
152. Id. at 941.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 945.
155. Id. at 946.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 950.
158. Id. at 959.
159. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
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nience office copier" market."'0 After a series of agreements in which
Xerox acquired licensing rights to the patents and took on sublicens-
ing obligations, Xerox acquired title to the patents in 1956 under a
contract that also abrogated its sublicensing requirements."' A jury
determined that this transaction was the only action of Xerox that
caused injury to SCM by excluding it from the office copier
market.6 2 However, the jury found that this market did not come into
existence until 1969, when it was dominated by Xerox.'63 The ques-
tion presented to the court was whether a patent acquisition'64 can
form the basis for a monopolization claim when it occurs prior to the
existence of the relevant market.
SCM argued that the acquisition of the patents by Xerox, which
subsequently gave it monopoly power in the convenience office
copier market, was actionable because the patents related to a
"reasonably forseeable economic market" and the agreement imposed
restraints on competition that were greater than necessary for the
development and marketing of the patented products.6 ' This "rule of
reason" contention failed to persuade the court, which was unwilling
to find that a monopolization violation can occur "prior to the com-
mercialization of the patented invention and prior to the appearance
of the relevant market .. 6 It held that the proper focus should
be upon the market power that would be conferred by the patent in
relation to the market position then held by the acquiring party.'
The result proposed by SCM, according to the court, "would severely
trample upon the incentives provided by our patent laws and thus
undermine the entire patent system."'66
STANDING
In Chrysler Corp. v. Feders Corp.,' the Sixth Circuit reviewed
a decision of a district court that dismissed on the ground of stand-
160. Id. at 1197.
161. Id. at 1197-99.
162. Id. at 1201.
163. Id. at 1202.
164. A patent acquisition, as distinguished from the acquisition or maintenance of
power pursuant to a patent, can be actionable under the antitrust laws. The patent
laws permit a party holding a patent to use it and to exclude others from using the in-
vention. Id. at 1205. However, a party with monopoly power may not be able to
enlarge this power by acquiring a patent, nor can a party attempt to enlarge the patent
monopoly beyond the scope of the patent through the use of its market power. Id..
165. Id. at 1208.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1209. The court in SCM also rejected claims made under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, and a claim that an allegedly illegal ty-
ing arrangement caused injury to SCM.
169. 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981).
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ing a suit brought by Chrysler under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Chrysler had sold to Fedders virtually all of the assets in
Chrysler's Airtemp Divison, which engaged in the marketing of non-
automotive air conditioning systems. However, Chrysler later
became dissatisfied with the agreement. It brought suit alleging a
number of state law claims against Fedders as well as the antitrust
claims. The district court ruled that an allegation of "antitrust in-
jury" is required for a plaintiff to sue under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 170 Characterizing the suit as a breach of contract action, it held
that Chrysler lacked standing."
The court of appeals reiterated two standing requirements
already adopted in the Sixth Circuit. They include: "(1) an allegation
that the defendant caused the plaintiff injury in fact, and (2) that the
interest which the plaintiff seeks to protect is arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the relevant antitrust laws."'72 In ad-
dition, the court reviewed the 1977 decision of the Supreme Court in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc."3 and found that it added
a third requirement: "that the pleading of 'antitrust injury' is an
essential component of standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act."'17
In Brunswick, the plaintiff claimed that it was injured by a bowl-
ing equipment manufacturer that purchased and operated certain
failing retail outlets; its actions had the effect of preserving competi-
tion.'" Although the plaintiff may have been injured by these activi-
ties, the Supreme Court determined that it was not the type of in-
jury that "the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.""' To permit
an action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Court said, the "in-
jury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation
or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation."' The
Court did not specifically characterize this holding as a ruling on
standing, but the Sixth Circuit construed Brunswick as adding a
third standing requirement."7
In applying the new element of the standing test, the court of
appeals found itself compelled to focus on the "type of injury pleaded
and its relationship to the alleged anticompetitive conduct.''. Under
170. Id. at 1231.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1233.
173. 429 U.S. 477 (1970).
174. 643 F.2d at 1234.
175. Id. at 1233-34.
176. 429 U.S. at 489.
177. Id.
178. 643 F.2d at 1234.
179. Id. at 1235.
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this analysis, it was unable to find any antitrust injury flowing from
the alleged subversion by Fedders of the agreement to acquire the
assets of the Airtemp Division. The elimination of Chrysler from the
market was due to its own voluntary execution of the agreement,
not the subsequent actions of Fedders.'" Therefore, the third prong
of the standing requirement was deemed unsatisfied. On the other
issues, however, including the claim that Chrysler was injured as a
purchaser of air conditioning equipment by the conduct of Fedders,
the standing requirements were held to be met."'1
TREATMENT OF DISTRIBUTORS
In two decisions of the Ninth Circuit and one ruling of the Third
Circuit, the courts rejected claims that actions taken by product
suppliers against distributors were violative of the antitrust laws.
The allegedly wrongful conduct was held non-actionable even though
it occurred after the suppliers received requ6sts to take the action
from other customers that were or would be in competition with the
affected distributors. The decisions of the Ninth Circuit were
grounded in the failure of the plaintiff to show injury to competition
flowing from the suppliers' conduct.' 2 The Third Circuit refused to
permit the inference of a conspiracy between the supplier and the
competing distributor in the absence of proof of a conscious commit-
ment to a common scheme." 3
In one of the Ninth Circuit decisions, the court affirmed a sum-
mary judgment dismissing the complaint of a prospective car dealer
that had its franchise application rejected by Fiat Distributors, Inc.,
a supplier, in Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distributors,
Inc.'8' The prospective dealer claimed that the franchise would have
been awarded except for the intervention of another dealer that
already owned a franchise for the sale of Fiat automobiles in the af-
fected market. Although the court assumed that the rejection of the
franchise application resulted from concerted action, it upheld the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action did not
substantially and adversely affect competition.
In refusing to find the alleged concerted conduct actionable, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished the holding of the Supreme Court in
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. " There, the Court held
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1235-36.
182. A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981); Ron Tonkin
Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distrib., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
183. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980).
184. 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
185. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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that a concerted refusal to deal would be per se illegal, requiring no
showing of an adverse affect on competition.'" However, Klor's in-
volved allegations that a number of manufacturers and distributors
refused to deal with the plaintiff at the behest of a competing
dealer, not a claim that one manufacturer and one dealer conspired
to exclude another dealer from a market.'8" Noting that Klor's has
frequently been criticized for failing to delineate the limits of the
per se rule188 and that Ninth Circuit precedent indicated that a per
se rule should not be applied to concerted refusals to deal in the
absence of an anticompetitive purpose or effect,' the court held
that the per se rule was inapplicable unless "the challenged activity
clearly had, or was likely to have, a pernicious effect on competition
and lacked any redeeming virtue."'90 Under this analysis the court
found the per se rule inapplicable because Fiat possessed only a
small share of the relevant market and the potential adverse effect
on intrabrand competition of the refusal to appoint an additional
dealer could have been offset by a benefit to interbrand
competition .1
Under the rule of reason standard, the plaintiff's claim was also
rejected, on the same ground. The court held that "[ajppellant has
simply failed to evidence 'significant probative evidence' of a
substantially adverse effect on competition."'92
The other Ninth Circuit decision, A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star
Machinery Co.,' 3 also turned on the absence of anticompetitive im-
pact. A crane distributor brought an antitrust action after its pro-
duct line was taken away by the manufacturer and given to a rival
distributor. In Cox, however, the court refused to view the impact of
the distributor termination as primarily horizontal and on this basis
pretermitted the application of the per se rule."" It found that
economic impact of a change in distributors "is not altered merely
because the dealer initiated the contract or actively sought the
change, provided the manufacturer ultimately makes the decision
based on its independent business judgment."'90 It recognized a right
of a distributor to initiate a change in product lines, especially when
186. Id. at 211.
187. d. at 212-13.
188. 637 F.2d at 1382.
189. Id. at 1385-86.
190. Id at 1387.
191. Id. at 1387-88.
192. Id. at 1388.
193. 653 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981).
194. Id. at 1305.
195. Id. at 1307.
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each distributor has only one product line.1"' Under the rule of
reason, the failure of the plaintiff to show any injury to competition
was dispositive. 7
In the Third Circuit decision of Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc.
v. Texaco, Inc.,"" the basis for rejecting the distributor's claim was
an asserted inadequacy in the proof of concerted action of the sup-
plier and the complainant's rival dealers. The supplier, Texaco,
allegedly terminated an agreement with a price-cutting dealer and
changed its hauling allowance after complaints were received from
other dealers about the price cutting practices. Although Texaco
acted in response to the complaints, the court of appeals upheld a
directed verdict for Texaco. According to the court, proof of a con-
certed action requires a showing of a "conscious commitment to a
common scheme."'" The showing that employees of Texaco acted
after receiving complaints from the rivals of the discounting dealer
was held insufficient to permit an inference of a conspiracy. °0
RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX ANTITRUST CASES
Although it backed away from taking a stand on whether or not
a complexity exception to the right of jury trial exists in antitrust
treble damage cases, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a jury trial cannot
be denied simply because it would be difficult for a jury to reach a
rational decision in Cetton v. Witco Chemical Corp. ' Expressing no
opinion as to the validity of the complexity exception recognized by
the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation,"' the Fifth Circuit ruled that "if such an exception exists,
it is only to be applied when the trial judge finds that the case is so
complex that a jury could not render a rational decision based on a
reasonable understanding of the evidence and applicable rules of
law."2 3
The district court in Witco had not ruled that the case was too
complex to be understood by a jury. Instead, it determined it would
be "'most difficult, if not impossible, for a jury to reach a rational
decision . ... '"20. This finding was deemed insufficient to justify
196. Id.
197. Id. An attempt to monopolize claim was also rejected by the court. I& at
1308-09.
198. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980).
199. Id at 111.
200. Id Rulings of the district court rejecting attempt to monopolize and Robinson-
Patman claims were also upheld. Id at 118, 122.
201. 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981).
202. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). See Fontham, supra note 48, at 417-28.
203. 651 F.2d at 276.
204. Id.
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striking the jury demand whether or not an exception is recognized
to the right of a jury trial in complex cases. As the Fifth Circuit
pointed out, even the Japanese Electronic Products holding set a
stricter standard for the denial of a jury trial. There, the Third Cir-
cuit stated that for the exception to apply, "[t]he complexity of a
suit must be so great that it renders the suit beyond the ability of a
jury to decide by rational means with a reasonable understanding of
the evidence and applicable legal rules." ' 5
The failure of the Fifth Circuit to decide whether the right of a
jury trial can be abrogated at all on the ground of complexity was
criticized in the concurring opinion of Judge Tate, who advocated "a
square holding that the constitutional right of jury trial in antitrust
damage suits . . . prevents any judicial abrogation of this right on
the grounds of complexity or inconvenience." 0' Judge Tate argued
that the authorities are virtually unanimous on the point and the
decision of the court would tend "to create uncertainty in the circuit
law on an issue where until now there was certainty."207
REAL ESTATE MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE
In United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc."08 the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the admission practices of a real estate multiple listing
service operating in Muscogee County, Georgia. The multiple listing
corporation, like other multiple listing services, functioned as a
trade exchange for the purchase and sale of real estate. It acquired
significant market power, having as members the majority of real
estate brokers in the county, thousands of listings and more than fifty
million dollars in sales.'" The corporation imposed certain limita-
tions on membership, including the requirements that the applicant
possess a favorable credit and business reputation and an office
open during customary hours of business. In addition, applicants
were required to pay membership fees established by the corpora-
tion's board of directors that were not necessarily related to the
cost of maintaining the multiple listing service.
The court determined that the membership rules, to the extent
they excluded applicants from participation in the multiple listing
service, constituted a group boycott. 1 However, it declined to rule
205. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir.
1980).
206. 651 F.2d at 277.
207. Id.
208. 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
209. Id. at 1357.
210. Id. at 1365.
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that the membership requirements were per se illegal. Finding that
significant economic advantages flow from the multiple listing ap-
proach,"' the court indicated a "need to know more about the
justifications for the particular restraints imposed and their com-
petitive significance before we can judge their legality."2 2 It applied
a rule of reason analysis, but found that the requirements were
facially unreasonable when imposed by a multiple listing service
with significant market power." 3
The market power analysis was characterized as the
"threshold" ' inquiry in determining the validity of the membership
rules. The test applied was whether the association possessed suffi-
cient power to deny non-members the opportunity to compete effec-
tively with members."' This test could not be applied with math-
ematical precision, but the court found that "[alt the least, when
broker participation in the listing service is high, the service itself
is economically successful and competition from other listing ser-
vices is lacking, rules which invite the unjustified exclusion of any
broker should be found unreasonable. 1 6
In facially evaluating the reasonableness of the membership
standards, the Fifth Circuit applied two rules. First, the member-
ship criteria, to be valid, must be "justified by the legitimate com-
petitive needs of the association." '  Second, they must be
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the legitimate goals
"and narrowly tailored to that end." 8 Assuming the existence of the
requisite amount of market power, the membership criteria were
deemed invalid. The "favorable credit report and business reputa-
tion" requirements were too subjective for validation .2 " The
"customary hours" requirement was deemed inadequately tailored
to legitimate objectives of the association." The stock purchase re-
quirement was invalid because the association possessed the power
to set the admission fee above a level designed to serve its
legitimate needs."'
211. Id. at 1367-69.
212. Id. at 1369.
213. Id. at 1374-87.
214. Id. at 1372.
215. Id. at 1373.
216. Id. at 1374. The issue was left open on remand, but the court indicated that
the existence of sufficient market power was a "reasonable inference" from the record
developed prior to the district court's summary judgment decision. Id. at 1389.
217. Id. at 1374.
218. Id. at 1375.
219. Id. at 1383.
220. Id. at 1384-85.
221. Id. at 1387.
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CONSPIRACY INVOLVING RELATED CORPORATIONS
A split among the circuits exists on the issue of whether related
corporations can participate in a "conspiracy" in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. The Third and Fifth Circuits have held that a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiaries, when separately incor-
porated, together provide the requisite plurality of actors as a mat-
ter of law."2 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have approached the
issue as a question of fact to be decided in light of the circumstances
of each case."2 In Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp.,"4 the Eighth Circuit joined
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in ruling that a "single enterprise
defense" is not foreclosed in cases involving separate but inter-
related companies.2 5
To foreclose the defense as a matter of law, the court ruled,
would elevate "form over substance in a manner inconsistent with
the intent of the antitrust laws.""22 According to the court, when
separate corporations in reality form a single economic enterprise,
the Congressional requirement of a plurality of actors is not met.2
It held that Fotomat Corp. and its subsidiary, Fotomat Labs, Inc.,
were not separate actors, applying the following evidentiary
analysis:
Fotomat referred to itself and its subsidiary collectively as "the
Company." Corporate officers of Fotomat always served as the
officers of Fotomat Labs. Moreover, bonuses and other executive
remuneration over fixed salaries were based on calculations of
Fotomat's profit alone. In addition, Fotomat Labs had no cor-
porate headquarters separate from those of Fotomat. Fotomat
Labs never filed separate financial statements to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or the Internal Revenue Service. On
the contrary, Fotomat filed consolidated statements reflecting
the financial condition of its entire organization including both
unincorporated divisions and its subsidiary. Finally, the uncon-
troverted evidence establishes that Fotomat incorporated Foto-
mat Labs for the purpose of according disparate labor benefits
222. See Columbia Metal Culvert Co., Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579
F.2d 20, 33-34 & n.49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equipment Co.,
Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978).
223. See Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp. 606 F.2d 704,
726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Harvey v. Fearless Farris
Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 455-58 (9th Cir. 1979).
224. 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981).
225. Id. at 588.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 589.
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to the two companies' employees and availing itself of certain
tax benefits.228
Thus, the two corporations were held to be incapable of conspiracy
under the Sherman Act.
FRANCHISE TYING ARRANGEMENTS
In Principe v. McDonald's Corp.,"' the Fourth Circuit determined
that the practice of McDonald's of requiring its franchisees to
operate their franchises in premises leased from McDonald's was not
an illegal tying arranagment. The court found that the "overall fran-
chise package" offered by McDonald's included the selection of sites
and the planning of the type of store to locate on each site.3 0 These
activities are part of the factors contributing to the overall success
of the McDonald's program.23 ' Thus, the lease arrangement could not
be considered a "separate product" from the franchise itself.232
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept the plaintiff's argument
that Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,2" a decision of the Ninth Circuit
that distinguished the trademark from other products offered by the
franchisor, was controlling. Stating "[f]ranchising has come a long
way since the decision in Chicken Delight,"' the court held that the
emphasis on the trademark as the essence of a franchise is too
restrictive. It adopted the following rule:
Given the realities of modern franchising, we think the proper
inquiry is not whether the allegedly tied products are associated
in the public mind with the franchisor's trademark, but whether
they are integral components of the business method being fran-
chised. Where the challenged aggregation is an essential ingre-
dient of the franchised system's formula for success, there is but
a single product and no tie in exists as a matter of law."'
Thus, the lease arrangement was held not to be a separate product
and no tying arrangement could exist.
228. Id.
229. 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980).
230. Id. at 305-07.
231. Id. at 309-10.
232. Id. at 309.
233. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
234. 631 F.2d at 309.
235. Id.
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